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Abstract
The recent shift in migration literature towards a focus on migrant sending countries has been
characterized by a negative impact of remittances on human rights and other political insti-
tutions. Furthering this literature, we claim that remittances increase neoliberal reforms in
migrant sending countries. Given the multiplicity of incentives to support neoliberal policies
on the part of the migrant, the remittance receiver, and the sending country’s government, we
expect the remittance share of GDP to positively influence the presence of neoliberal policies in
the migrant-sending country. Using the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index as a proxy
for neoliberalism, we implement an instrumental variable model to address the endogeneity of
remittances, and show that there is a positive relationship between remittance share of GDP
and neoliberalism.
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1
Introduction
Historically, migration literature has focused mainly on the economic changes a country under-
goes upon the reception of migrants. As globalization began to pick up pace, and technological
innovation made travel easier during the course of the past century, the global community began
to grapple with their relationship to “newcomers”. The most direct consequences of migration
fall on the receiving country, which has skewed scholarship towards a focus on host economies.
It is only in the past few decades that migration literature has started to pay attention to
the migrant sending country. This new focus has also sparked academic interest in the role of
remittances (the money sent by migrants to family back home) in the economic and political
realms of the origin country. Baudassé (2018) has published a comprehensive survey of this
new wave [9]. Previous literature has largely ignored the potential socioeconomic and political
changes that countries undergo as a consequence of emigration 1. The first wave of this new
body of literature has been characterized by optimism in regards to the positive influence of
the diaspora on the country of origin. For example, Spilimbergo (2009) discusses the role of the
diaspora in transferring democratic norms back to the country of origin [41]. Pfutze (2012; 2014)
also discusses the role of the diaspora in the institutional quality of its home country, and claims
1The migration of people out of their home countries
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it influences the mobilization of protests against autocratic regimes present in origin countries
[33] [34].
The most recent wave of this new literature has started to question whether the optimism
towards the diaspora’s relationship with the country of origin has been warranted. Recent liter-
ature has suggested a negative impact of the increase in remittances on human rights [7]. Doyle
(2015) has speculated that migration leads to a shift in government spending away from public
goods because increased remittances change voting tendencies for households [18]. Some authors
have also explored a reverse channel of causality where remittances increase the likelihood of
autocracies or poor institutions [3].
This paper will attempt to contribute to the growing discussion of the role of the diaspora
on the country of origin. Considering the contributions made by this new wave of literature,
we claim that the diaspora, through the channel of remittances, has the power to positively
influence neoliberalism in migrant sending countries. Neoliberalism is generally characterized by
the presence of pro-market policies: privatization, dergulation, welfare reduction, trade liberal-
ization, among others. Following the literature previously discussed (and to be expanded on in
the following sections) we claim that the diaspora has incentive to lobby for neoliberal reforms
in the migrant sending country, and the power of influence the voting preferences of their kin
back home. We also claim that remittance recipients will benefit from these neoliberal policies
because of their new income source.
The following section will construct a working definition of neoliberalism and discuss the
theoretical impact of remittances on neoliberal reforms in migrant sending countries. We engage
with existing literature to establish a theoretical chain of causality. Given the multiplicity of
channels, we find that there is a need to empirically examine our claim. The following sections
will give an overview of the foundations and history of neoliberalism, construct a theoretical
basis for our argument, and empirically model hypothesized relationship.
2
Neoliberalism
In order to assess the potential impact of remittances on neoliberal reforms in migrant sending
countries, we first need to pin down a working definition of neoliberalism - an ambiguously yet
widely used term both in academic literature and political rhetoric. In this section, we shall
construct a definition of neoliberalism, mostly relying on David Harvey’s A Brief History of
Neoliberalism (2007), Quinn Slobodian’s Globalists (2018), and Mirowski’s The Road to Mont
Pelerin (2009) 1. In the following section, we will use this definition to support our use of the
economic freedom index as our dependent variable, and also to explain its theoretical connection
to remittances.
Neoliberalism at its most broad level is a political movement mobilized by corporations and
motivated by corporate interests. Harvey characterizes a “neoliberal state” as one whose main
goal is to create and maintain good conditions for capital accumulation for both foreign and
domestic capital [24]. Underneath this overarching goal is a deeper purpose: to transfer the
control of the economy from the government to the private market [12]. Shifting the role of the
government in the economy says something more about individual liberty; this restructuring
implies that the market, not the government, is the best arbiter of individual freedom [24].
1Please refer to these texts for more on Neoliberalism, as its history and theoretical determinacy are too robust to be
fully covered in this paper
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Although neoliberalism is a much broader concept than can be captured in the description
of policies, it is essential to the arguments in the coming sections to define the types of policies
that further the neoliberal agenda. Such policies will carry out the motives of the neoliberal-
ism agenda by prioritizing corporate interests and limiting regulation and state involvement in
economic affairs. First in these categories of policies is privatization. Privatization policies will
cede control of once state-owned industries to private enterprises, thereby eliminating state in-
terference and letting the market take control of certain industries. For the private sector, this
alleviates competition from state controlled industries. Second is the deregulation of the labor
market. These policies remove the government as the mediator of employer-employee relations
by retracting regulatory legislation, and often have implications for unions and workers’ bar-
gaining rights [20]. Third is the deregulation of international capital flows. The elimination of
constraints on capital flows fosters the goal of creating good conditions for capital accumula-
tion. Policies that contribute to the reduction of the welfare state also get the label of neoliberal,
since spending on welfare programs such as social security or food stamps is an imposition of
government on the market, contradictory to the neoliberal agenda.
Centeno (2012) outlines three different dimensions to the “arc” of neoliberalism: “(a) a tech-
nical policy debate regarding the best mode of operating an economy; (b) an institutionalised
crisis containment strategy involving political choices and power; and (c) the rise of a hegemonic
ideology or system of thought” [12]. The trajectory of neoliberalism during the past century is
characterized by these three dimensions, making it imperative that we look at each in order to
fully understand it. The rest of this chapter will outline how neoliberalism has presented through
these three dimensions over the past century.
2.1 Overview
Economic research (and the conceptualization of the economy as a whole, for that matter) had
a different face before the Great Depression. Pre-1930, it was marked by business cycle research,
which consisted of tracking patterns of economic crises and publishing certain statistics and
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measures [38]. The conceptualization of the economy as something measurable and cyclic led
policy makers to believe that they could manipulate the economy from the realm of the political.
The founding neoliberals- Hayek, Mises, and Harbeler, among others - “concluded that the world
economy was sublime, beyond representation and quantification”, changing the conceptualization
of the world economy [38]. This was the beginning of the intellectual movement of neoliberalism,
which wouldn’t make its way into mainstream policy until much later. The idea that the world
economy was something beyond what models and statistics and indexes, would become the basis
for a new way of carrying out economic policy. For these early neoliberals, “what could not be
seen could not be engineered” [38]. If the economy was immeasurable, how could we think it
effective to attempt to manipulate and control it by direct state interventions?
Hints of the idea that the economy was something more were present in the formation of the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in 1919. The post-WWI economic conditions begged
the question of why there was no international governance of any aspects of the global economy.
After WWI, there was widespread concern about trade inhibitions, partially motivating the need
for global economic governance with regard to trade policies, international finance, and exchange
rates. Crises provide fuel for new conceptualizations of the political economy, since the paradigm
shift of a crisis often illuminates institutional and policy related shortcomings 2. During the first
meeting, “the members of the ICC declared that ‘a nation is not an independent economic unit”
and that “every day, the facts demonstrate the interdependence of all countries in the economic
domain” [38]. The establishment of all economies as interdependent would become the basis
for the neoliberal argument that international institutions were needed to insulate the global
economy, since direct intervention on the economy contradicted the neoliberal conclusion that
the economy was fundamentally unknowable.
The Great Depression of the 1930’s sparked an era of Keynesian economics, developed by John
Maynard Keynes in an attempt to understand what happened during the crash. The economic
and social destruction caused by the Depression forced people to reconsider the previous policy
2A sentiment that is currently being mimicked globally
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regime that had failed them. As previously mentioned, crises tend to usher in new political
regimes in order to correct whatever had caused (or more moderately, not prevented) the crisis
to begin with. Keynesian policy was invented to lift the economy out from under the rubble
of the aftereffects of the Depression. Characterized by welfare programs and huge government
spending to boost aggregate demand, Keynesian policy contradicted the basis of neoliberalism
in all that it sought to prevent: the intervention of the state in the economy.
The need for welfare provisioning, however, was necessary in order to support the population
during the mass unemployment after the Great Depression. This forced the government to be
heavily embedded in the economy. FDR’s New Deal (1933-1939) that was meant to stimulate
the economy in effect fostered the “disintegration of the world order” according to neoliberals
[38]. The New Deal’s “organized labor, protectionism, and planning had ‘politicized’ economic
processes and eroded the foundations of liberal international economic relations” [38]. The ne-
oliberals of the time squirmed in the shadows at the politicization of the economy - what they
would argue was the biggest problem ideological neoliberalism sought to solve.
World War II presented the same offenses to neoliberalism as the Great Depression did. The
cost of war and providing provisions, in addition to the need to provide welfare programs both
during and after the war, furthered the grasp of Keynesianism on economic policy. The increase
in “social spending, public investment, enterprise ownership, and market regulation” to control
the after effects of the war required the engorgement of the government which increased its role
in economic affairs [12]. Between WWII and the OPEC oil crisis in the early 1970’s, Keynesian
policy was at its height, “the key guarantor of domestic peace and tranquility” was a “‘class
compromise’ between capital and labour” [24]. This compromise was meant to satisfy the public
concern for social issues such as unemployment and welfare that was at its height after the war.
Planned economies, where the state owned key industries - such as in Britain, France, and Italy,
became prevalent [24] . Competition, in countries where the state owned most key sectors, was
sacrificed in the hopes of lower levels of unemployment and inequality. The prioritization of
growth, employment and equality in this era meant heavy state control and regulation, which
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inevitably put constraints on capital. In addition to the growth inhibiting capital constraints,
the 1960’s were marked by U.S. worker productivity decline and trade deficits. The neoliberals,
once in the shadows, took note.
The establishment of the Mont Pelerin Society (MPS) in 1947 gave the neoliberals a more
structured forum for discussion, but did not entirely lift them out of the margins. The neoliberals
for the most part did not think that their ongoing discomfort with state intervention in economic
affairs should be solved by a complete obliteration of the state’s role in the economy. Their goal
was to find the right institutions to sustain the often strained balance between the economic world
and the political world [38]. The Geneva School of neoliberals prescribed neither an “obliteration
of politics by economics nor the dissolution of states into a global marketplace but a carefully
structured and regulated settlement between the two” [38]. The global economy as inherently
‘unknowable’ could not be entirely commanded by the political realm, but needed to be respected
as an entity in its own right alongside the realm of the political. The separation of these two,
for the MPS, could be partially fostered by policies of “privatization, deregulation, and financial
and trade liberalization” [29].
The long rule of Keynesianism succeeded in bringing the economy back from the Great De-
pression and WWII. Keynes’ policies worked for the most part, until they no longer worked. The
OPEC 3 oil embargo of 1973 induced price shocks and sparked a time of sustained inflation and
high unemployment in developed nations [12]. The simultaneous presence of stagnation (slowing
growth) and inflation 4 contradicted the Keynesian belief that inflation was caused by an “over-
heated economy” [12]. Thus began the international rejection of Keynesian policies, since the
theory could no longer explain what was happening as a result of the oil embargo. Beyond the
rejection of Keynesianism, the crisis brought into question the legitimacy of the state in terms
of its ability to impact economic outcomes [12]. The failure of Keynesianism (and potentially
the nation-state as well) in both explaining and solving the economic issues resulting from the
oil crisis caused political leaders and policy makers to turn to the neoliberals for a new model.
3The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
4What we now term as “stagflation”
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With the shift towards neoliberalism as the prominent governing ideology, the problems in-
herent in previous economic policy were illuminated. Hayek, one of the founding fathers of
neoliberalism, claimed that:
“in this century our attempts to create an international government capable of as-
suring peace have generally approached the task from the wrong end: creating large
numbers of specialized authorities aiming at particular regulations rather than aim-
ing at a true international law which would limit the powers of national governments
to harm each other.” [25]
As the globalization took hold of the world, economies became more intertwined, creating an
entity that was beyond individual state governance. Neoliberals illuminated the need for world
economic governance. The ‘globalists’ that Slobodian (2018) refers to thought that the world
order was most important to maintain, and that the dethronement of the nation-state through
limiting the power of sovereignty would allow for the prioritization of the world order [38].
Harvey (2007) suggests that the first attempt at a neoliberal state was by Chile in 1973 [24].
The U.S. backed a coup led by Augusto Pinochet to (successfully) dismantle the government of
the previous president Salvador Allende. Pinochet, after the coup and his subsequent installment
as head of the government, brought in University of Chicago trained economists, who brought
with them a neoliberal tilt [24]. Pinochet and the Chicago trained economists eventually “re-
versed the nationalizations and privatized public assets, opened up natural resources (fisheries,
timber, etc.) to private and unregulated exploitations (in many cases riding roughshod over the
claims of indigenous inhabitants), privatized social security, and facilitated foreign direct invest-
ment and freer trade” [24]. The mostly successful attempt by Chile to liberate the economy from
the public sector would set the stage for more attempts at neoliberal states around the world.
The neoliberal surge that defined the 1980’s is often attributed to former president of the
United States, Ronald Reagan, and former prime minister of Britain, Margaret Thatcher. When
Thatcher and Reagan took office in the late 70’s and early 80’s they were faced with the challenge
of dealing with the stagflation (in part caused by the OPEC oil crisis) that the crisis of the 70’s
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had left them [24]. The crisis of capital accumulation and stagflation that marked the 70’s
derailed the formerly positive attitudes towards Keynesian policies. The immediate goals after
the oil crisis were price stabilization and the elimination of inflation - which were achieved in
the mid 90s “though paid for with significant economic downturns and increasing inequality”
[12]. The secondary goal was the deregulation of the financial sector [12]. Alongside each other,
Reagan and Thatcher made the 80’s a decade marked by deregulation, financial liberation, and
the restriction of labor power. Thatcher and Reagan were not secretive in their goals to eliminate
restraints in favor of capital, reneging on the capital-labor compromise that had been in place the
preceding decades. The World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) followed suit in quickly rejecting Keynesian policy in favor of neoliberal
ideas. These principles not only impacted global policy but also had “pervasive effects on ways
of thought to the point where it [had] become incorporated into the common-sense way many
of us interpret, live in, and understand the world” [24]. The underpinning ideology motivating
neoliberalism is the “assumption that individual freedoms are guaranteed by freedom of the
market and of trade” [24]. The shift towards neoliberalism in the 80’s was not only the advent
of a new prevailing type of economic policy to address previous policy failures, but was a change
in public sentiment and ethics. The hegemony of neoliberalism that persisted throughout the
80’s, 90’s and early 2000’s can be partially attributed to Reagan and Thatcher’s commitment
to making these ideas mainstream through policy initiatives.
In 1989, John Williamson (a senior fellow at the Institute for International Economics at the
time) coined the now popular term ‘Washington Consensus’. In his 1990 paper, he outlined 10
policy tools originally meant for certain developing Latin American countries that were suffering
a debt crisis in the 80’s [48]. The policy tools can be summarized as: (1) privatization, (2)
liberalization of interest rates, (3) fiscal discipline, (4) reorientation of public spending priorities,
(5) liberalization of FDI, (6) competitive exchange rates, (7) tax reform, (8) trade liberalization,
(9) strong property rights, and (10) deregulation [47]. The term, despite being originally meant as
a prescription for Latin American economies, has become widely used to describe more generally
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market-oriented policy approaches, given the neoliberal nature of the ten policies it originally
described.
The next benchmark achievement for the neoliberals was the formation of the European Union
(EU) in 1993. This was an integral example of encasement of the ‘global economy’ (as Slobodian
(2018) so often terms it) - or rather in this case, the economy of a union of multiple nation-
states. The establishment of the EU meant that the law of the Union superseded the law (and
sovereignty) of the individual states.
The ambiguity surrounding the term ‘neoliberalism’ is not without reason. Edwin Feulner of
the Heritage Foundation 5, a prominent neoconservative 6, claimed that the neoliberal intellec-
tuals’ Mont Pelerin Society was founded
“to uphold the principles of what Europeans call ‘liberalism’ (as opposed to
‘statism’), and what we Americans call ‘conservatism’ (as opposed to ‘liberalism’).
Unlike socialism, neoliberalism flourished in the United States, even if it was more
obscured here than elsewhere in the world.” [29]
. The ambiguity of the term is rooted in the fact that it has a presence in both the aca-
demic/intellectual realm as well as the realm of policy. John Williamson, who coined the term
Washington Consensus, defended himself against criticism regarding his use of the term neolib-
eralism:
“I use the world ‘neoliberalism’ in its original sense, to refer to the doctrines espoused
by the Mont Pelerin Society. If there is another definition, I would love to hear what
it is so that I can decide whether neoliberalism is more than an intellectual swear
word.” [48]
5A conservative think tank founded in 1973
6A political movement popularized in the 60’s and generally characterized by ‘war hawks’ that were sick of U.S. pacifism
in foreign policy. This group equally valued capitalism and the market but were more skeptical than neoliberals of the social
disturbances that could be caused by the reduction of state intervention in the economy. Brown (2006) claims that “what
we have in neoliberalism and neoconservatism, then, is a market-political rationality and a moral-political rationality, with
a business model of the state in one case and a theological model of the state in the other” [11]
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The dichotomy of neoliberalism as an ideology and as a policy framework has often muddied
the definition and use of the term. Neoliberalism is often associated with, and in some cases
defined by, the era and policies of Reagan and Thatcher. The misconception that the funda-
mental value of neoliberalism is the retraction of the state has long been present due to the
popularization of the Reagan/Thatcher era as a model of neoliberalism. The ideological founda-
tions of neoliberalism, however, dictate that it is much more than that. During the 1986 general
meeting of the MPS in San Vincenzo, Italy, James Buchanan - the president of the society -
addressed widespread concern that MPS neoliberalism was rhetoric formed to fuel the agenda
of anarcho-capitalists:
“Among our members, there are some who are able to imagine a viable society
without a state. . . For most of our members, however, social order without a state is
not readily imagined, at least in any normatively preferred sense. . . Of necessity, we
must look at our relations with the state from several windows, to use the familiar
Nietzschean metaphor. . . Man is, and must remain, a slave to the state. But it is
critically and vitally important to recognize that ten per cent slavery is different
from fifty per cent slavery.” [29]
The policies described as ‘neoliberal’ are characterized by the retraction of state intervention
in the economy but are predicated on the notion that the economic realm cannot be intertwined
with the political realm. The restructuring of institutional relations that neoliberalism tries to
achieve “is equated not with gross downsizing of the government as much as it is with removing
government from those areas where a different sort of discipline is prescribed” [29]. Thus the
enactment of policies that nudge the government out of certain areas of economic life (private
enterprise, trade, regulation, and the other areas discussed in this section) indicate for us that
neoliberalism is awake and alive. The direct impacts of these policies and their relationship to
remittances will be discussed in the following section.
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3
Theoretical Framework
We consider three different actors in the relationship between remittances and neoliberal poli-
cies: the migrant, the remittance receiver, and the government of the origin country. Remittances
change the incentives of each of these actors in such a way that makes neoliberal policies par-
ticularly attractive. To the extent that the remittance receiving household shares the objectives
of the migrant, they share their incentives. However, it is important to note here that there is a
problem of asymmetric information between the migrant and the remittance recipient [7]. Since
the migrant cannot be sure of how the recipient is using the remittances, we need to specify the
incentives of both the migrant and the remittance recipient. In this section we will explore the
incentives of each of these three actors for supporting neoliberal policies in the face of increased
remittances.
3.1 Government
First we will look at the migrant-sending government’s incentives. Drawing from the broad base
of migration literature, we know that migration often occurs as a result of poor economic oppor-
tunity, corruption, economic crisis, conflict, political oppression, etc. Remittances, signalling the
size of the diaspora, tell us that the origin country suffered from some such political or economic
deficiency that would warrant intervention from an international agency. International devel-
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opment aid, IMF structural agreements and other such loans are often conditioned on policy
adjustments. According to Dreher (2006), the “availability of IMF money may deteriorate eco-
nomic policy even before it has been disbursed” [19]. There is a “moral hazard” that accompanies
IMF loans: governments can see these disbursements as income insurance and in turn feel less
compelled to protect themselves against crises [45]. Thus the IMF and other such international
institutions create policy requirements attached to their loans in order to prevent such moral
hazard and the ineffectiveness of the loan. The involvement of international agencies in the eco-
nomic/political affairs of a country is often closely intertwined with neoliberalism, considering
one of the motivations of neoliberalism is to maintain and insulate the “world economy” through
international institutions, as discussed in the previous section [38]. Thus these policy conditions
are often motivated by neoliberal interests- they include requirements of trade liberalization,
privatization, and financial deregulation.
The government is also under the pressure provided by international competition. As dis-
cussed in the previous section, the past few decades have seen the rise of neoliberalism, a wave
of globalization, and an increase in the importance of the world economy. Henisz et al (2005)
claim that between 1977 and 1999, a wave of neoliberal reforms came over the world, particu-
larly “in infrastructure industries such as telecommunications, electricity, water, sanitation, and
transportation, in which state-owned enterprises long enjoyed monopolies” [26]. The benefits of
reforms in these industries, such as increased efficiency, are discussed later in the section. Henisz
et al (2005) discuss three mechanisms through which the diffusion of neoliberal policies occur:
competitive mimicry, normative emulation, and international coercion [26]. The globalization
trend over the last century has coincided with the expansion of international trade, which fos-
ters stronger cultural ties between countries. The consequent social embeddedness of countries
increases their aptitude to conform to other countries, or to participate in “ normative emula-
tion” [26]. International coercion occurs through the vessels of institutions such as the IMF (as
discussed in the previous paragraph) that make tradeoffs with governments: policy changes in
exchange for development aid. Competitive mimicry is a strategy on the part of governments
3.1. GOVERNMENT 15
to “prevent erosion of one’s market position and social and political status” [26]. Government’s
mimic the policies of other governments in order to keep being competitive in the world economy.
Survival in this new globalized regime depends on a country’s ability to attract Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) and to compete on the world stage. Countries are competing for portfolio
investment and to house multinational enterprises. “Multinational enterprises (MNE) choose to
invest in countries with less restrictive standards,” so “foreign countries competitively undercut
each other’s standards in order to attract foreign direct investment”, encouraging governments
to deregulate both financial and labor markets [31]. The deregulation of labor markets - disas-
sembling unions and stripping away workers’ bargaining rights - allows corporations access to
cheaper labor. Financial deregulation allows companies ease of capital mobility and to operate
with less government oversight. Privatization provides corporations a market to enter without
government competition. Governments must institute these neoliberal policies in order to be a
viable competitor in this new regime.
Governments are not only under external pressure to enact neoliberal policies, but are also
under domestic pressure to do the same. As discussed in the previous section, neoliberalism
is a political project motivated by corporate interests [24]. The spreading global hegemony of
neoliberalism encourages corporations to push governments in the direction of policies that favor
corporate interests. From Chapter 2. we know that privatization policies reduce competition for
companies, financial deregulation creates good conditions for capital accumulation, and trade
liberalization also allows for easier export of goods. Since these policies are inherently beneficial
to corporations, it is in their benefit to pressure government towards the institution of these
policies.
Since remittances increase the disposable income of the receiving household, they also de-
crease the dependence of the household on the government [18]. With external income support,
households do not have to depend on government welfare programs for their economic survival.
Additionally, the burden of the taxes that would be necessary to support such welfare programs
would outweigh the benefit of the programs themselves - making remittances an even more de-
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pendable source of aid than the government [18]. The population’s decreased dependence on the
government also decreases the government’s obligation to the population. The government can
hence shirk their responsibilities to the population with ease, instituting policies that instead
favor corporate interests.
As we previously stated, migration indicates a shortfall of economic opportunity or governance
quality in the origin country. The population, acknowledging the shortcomings of its country,
expects the government to take action to improve these circumstances. In order to retain the
support of the population and prevent uprising, the government needs to show the population
they are doing something, even if it is not the most effective action. Acknowledging this, incum-
bents have incentive in particular to enact neoliberal policies, because “the added short term
revenue from doing so can alleviate fiscal problems, and thus increase their popular support”
[26]. The pressure from the population thus gives the government incentive to enact policies that
will make quick and noticeable changes to the economy.
3.2 Migrant
Next, we look at the incentives the migrant has for supporting neoliberal policies. It is first
important to understand how they express their changed objectives given that they are living
abroad (ie. they are geographically displaced from where the policy changes are occuring). Kapur
(2014) outlines four different channels through which migration impacts the political economy
of the migrant sending country: the absence, diaspora, prospective, and return channels [27]. We
shall focus mainly on the diaspora channel. The diaspora (the body of migrants living outside
of their home country) “challenge[s] the traditional boundaries of nation-states” [27]. Because
of their connection to family in their home country, they exert political influence despite being
geographically displaced. Kapur (2014) claims that this influence can happen in two different
ways. In some cases, migrants maintain their rights to vote for policies in their home country,
“whether as dual citizens or citizens residing abroad” [27]. The second way in which the diaspora
can influence the political outcomes of their home country is through the strong connections they
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maintain with their family residing in the home country. Since the family is likely relying on the
remittances of the diaspora member as a main source of income, it experiences a moral obligation
to represent the opinions of the remittance sender. Diaspora members thereby indirectly express
their voting preferences through their family back home.
Migrants living abroad experience the hegemony of neoliberalism that has developed over
the past several decades. They are socialized into the neoliberal norms of their host country,
and in some cases are educated by institutions that support neoliberal norms. Spilembergo
(2019) puts forth empirical evidence showing that individuals sent to be educated in democratic
countries transfer democratic norms back to their home country [41]. We argue that this same
transference applies to neoliberal norms. This transfer happens through the diaspora channel
that Kapur (2014) discusses. Migrants, having adopted new neoliberal ideologies, communicate
with the family they send remittances to and express these new ideologies. Households, under
a moral obligation to the remittance sender, expresses the migrant’s ideologies through their
own voting preferences. Otherwise, as Kapur (2014) claims, if the migrant retains voting rights,
they express their newly adapted ideologies directly [27]. Thus the socialization of migrants into
the neoliberal norms of their host country are expressed through the voting preferences of the
remittance receiving household via the diaspora channel.
Migrants have extra incentive to support neoliberal policies because of the financial trans-
fer of the remittances themselves. Neoliberal reforms and the deregulation that accompanies
them would reduce the cost of/fees associated with sending remittances. The remittance sender
would benefit from the increased ease of completing the transfer. Additionally, they would no
longer have to bear the additional costs of the transfer. Migrants again express these changed
preferences through the diaspora channel.
Neoliberal policies of privatization and deregulation are also beneficial for the maintenance
of the family ties fostered by remittances, and for the overall economic circumstances of those
left in the origin country.Privatization allows for competition in industries that were once state
controlled. The elimination of the government monopoly of certain industries allows competition
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to drive down the prices of goods. For example, the privatization of the telephone industry
will drive down communication costs, making it easier for migrants to communicate with their
families abroad. Everyday goods will also become cheaper as a result of price competition,
lessening financial burdens on those families living in the origin country - which is the ultimate
goal of the migrant. Migrants realize the benefits that neoliberal policies would bring, and express
the potential benefits through the diaspora channel.
We also consider a potential causal link through the prospective channel that Kapur (2014)
discusses [27]. At the most broad level, Kapur considers the prospective channel to occur as
a result of the way “expectations affect current behavior” [27]. Remittance receivers often put
their new income towards the creation of a small business in order to create a stable form of
income and potentially change the socioeconomic status of their family. Thus for the migrant,
the sending of remittances is in effect an investment. In anticipation of the use of the remit-
tances they are sending, the migrant has incentive to support policies that would make their
investment profitable. As discussed in the previous section, neoliberal reforms are motivated
by corporate interests, and as such strive to create conditions that are beneficial to private en-
terprise. Deregulation allows these small enterprises funded by remittances to operate without
government oversight, and privatization removes the direct competition they would experience
from the government. Diaspora members realize this potential investment and thus vote for
neoliberal policies or express those voting preferences through the diaspora channel.
3.3 Receiving Household
The remittance receiving household shares some of the same incentives as the migrant for sup-
porting neoliberal policies. Firstly is their objective to maintain low costs. Remittance receiving
households benefit from the lower prices brought about by privatization - which pulls the govern-
ment out of industries and allows competition to drive prices down. They also benefit because of
the cheaper and easier access to communication. The telecommunications industry experiences
the same price decreases from privatization, and also benefits from deregulation and reductions
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in government oversight. Keeping in touch with their migrant family abroad is particularly im-
portant considering they depend on them for supplementary income. Since remittance receivers
benefit from these policies, they have incentive to directly support them through their voting
choices.
These households also share the migrant’s concern for a potential future investment in a small
enterprise. In an attempt to create another steady stream of income and elevate the household’s
economic circumstances, receiving households put their remittance income towards the establish-
ment of small enterprises. Privatization and deregulation, as previously discussed, respectively
decrease competition by the government and decrease government oversight, allowing ease of
market entry. Thus such neoliberal policies would not ease the process of creating an enter-
prise and entering a market for households, but would also allow smoother and more profitable
operation of the enterprise after entry.
The receiving household also similarly benefits from the reduction of fees associated with
remittance transfers. The deregulatory initiatives started by neoliberal reforms would reduce
the cost of sending/receiving remittances. Receiving households would benefit in both cases: if
either the household or the migrant were bearing the cost of the transfer fee. If the household
were to bear the cost of the transfer, they benefit from deregulation policies simply because
they would no longer have to pay the fee. For the migrant, the cost of the transfer reduces the
amount of money they are able to remit back to the receiving household, since they have a fixed
amount of disposable income. Thus it is in the receiving households interest to reduce transfer
fees regardless of who is bearing the cost.
Though neoliberal policies become beneficial to the migrant, government, and remittance
receiver upon the increase of remittance flows, these policies still bear negative consequences for
the poor. The very essence of neoliberalism touches on the age old battle of whether and how
much the government should intervene in the market. Who is a better arbiter of freedom- the
market, or the government? Will the market take care of the masses of poverty if the government
decides not to step in? When classic Keynesian government intervention failed to work after the
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OPEC oil crisis, policy makers began to listen to the neoliberals that had largely been pushed to
the margins for years. Policies favoring the neoliberal ideology, however, have not come without
their faults.
In putting faith in the market, neoliberals retract the policies that Keynesians and members
of other schools of thought put in place to correct for whatever they thought the market was
failing at. A major consequence of this is the abolition of the welfare state, as discussed in the
previous section. Since the welfare state was designed to help those suffering socioeconomically,
we must carefully consider the incentives the receiving household has for supporting policies
that disassemble programs meant to provide them support. The new influx of income provided
by remittances allows receiving households to be less dependent on the government and such
welfare programs provided by it; a particularly relieving evolution for families particularly if
the government was corrupt and unreliable to begin with. Doyle (2015) puts forth empirical
evidence to support his claim that remittances decrease social spending/welfare expenditure on
the part of the government [18]. Remittances give families an external income source to rely
on, and so decrease incentive for them to support welfare policies that might be more unstable
than the remittances they are receiving. He also claims that families have greater hope for social
mobility/have a more positive outlook on the future when they receive remittances - which
makes them less supportive of policies that include taxation for the purpose of social programs
[18]. Since these families are on the lower end of the socioeconomic scale, the burden of new taxes
would outweigh the benefit they would receive from the social programs the taxes would support.
Lastly, Doyle claims that remittances make families more likely to see the income distribution
in their country as fair - and so make those families less likely to vote for policies that promote
redistribution [18]. Because remittances increase optimism and decrease reliance on government
aid, families do not vote for increases in social spending or welfare programs- reinforcing the
neoliberal distaste for the welfare state.
Individual circumstances blind remittance receivers to the broader implications of the policies
they are voting for. Remittances, as discussed above, enchant families into denying the help
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that the welfare state was constructed to provide. Instead, families vote for neoliberal policies
that favor corporate interests and a “free” market. In doing so they bring about the dissolution
of the welfare state and any government constructed program correcting for market failures
in the realm of poverty and inequality. These families effectively vote for policies that oppress
them and other members of their socioeconomic class. Navarro (2007) claims that neoliberal
policies have been “remarkably unsuccessful at achieving what they claim to be their aims:
economic efficiency and social well-being” [30]. He puts forth empirical evidence supporting the
claim that neoliberal policies in fact increase inequality in those countries that enact them.
The deregulation of labor markets that normally accompanies neoliberal reforms undermines
the well being of the working class. Deregulation normally includes either the dissolution or
disempowerment of unions, ultimately diminishing workers’ bargaining rights. Additionally, the
favoritism towards corporations and motivation for capital accumulation of neoliberal policies
inflates the status of the upper class. Such policies favor corporations at the expense of the
working class, and allow the upper class to continue extracting rents. The support of the upper
class and negligence of the working class by neoliberal policies furthers socioeconomic divides
and exacerbates inequality.
Since remittance receiving families are those that are negatively impacted most by increases
in inequality, we must consider what inspires their ignorance towards the consequences of
their policy preferences. There is a niche body of literature relating remittances to gover-
nance/institutional quality, and discussing the way in which remittances change families’ re-
lationship to governments. Ahmed (2017) observes that remittances, because they increase the
economic stability of those receiving them, could lead the receivers to believe that their new
wealth is attributed to improvements in the economy. Inferring that a good economy must be
attributed to the government’s decisions, remittance receivers have increased faith in government
[3]. Thus remittances not only foster trust in the government, but also decrease the chance of
success in a political protest against the government. If these governments are already carrying
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out neoliberal policies, it is less likely that remittance receiving families would vote to change
them considering their increased faith in the government.
3.4 Conclusion
Since there are three main actors that come into play during remittance transactions, we have
multiple reasons on three different fronts for remittances to reorient the incentives and voting
preferences of the different actors. The changes for the migrant, the government and the receiving
household that are induced by remittances increase the benefit of neoliberal policies to the agents.
The multiplicity of incentives on the part of three different agents to support neoliberal policies
gives us reason to empirically analyze our claim. In the next section we will define other factors
influencing neoliberalism in order to control for them in our empirical model.
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Data
Table 4.0.1. Summary Statistics
count mean Var sd min max Source
EFI 2538 6.670842 .9869825 .9934699 2.769631 9.199463 Fraser Institute
RemittofGDP 4192 .0343371 .0042898 .0654964 2.10e-07 .9225797 World Bank
NetODA 3989 4.52e+08 7.31e+17 8.55e+08 -1.05e+09 2.21e+10 World Bank
FDIofGDP 4795 .0390008 .0138432 .1176569 -.5522367 4.25053 World Bank
TradeofGDP 4774 85.92973 2595.746 50.94846 .0209992 442.62 World Bank
Crisis 5572 .112168 .0996042 .3156013 0 1 Reinhardt & Rogoff 2010
GDPpc 5110 12678.2 3.22e+08 17950.83 164.3366 111968.4 World Bank
We begin our empirical analysis by justifying our use of variables. Our set of covariates, shown
in the table above, are commonly used in the remittance literature. For our dependent variable,
we follow De Soysa (2013) in employing the the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index (EFI)
as a measure for the extent of neoliberal reforms [16]. The EFI “measures the degree to which
the policies and institutions of countries are supportive of economic freedom” [23]. The index
is comprised of scores on size of government, legal systems and property rights, sound money,
freedom to trade internationally, and regulation. Each of these subcomponents are based on
what the Fraser Institute deems to be the “cornerstones” of economic freedom: personal choice,
security of the person and privately owned property, freedom to enter markets and compete,
and voluntary exchange. The index ranges from 0 to 10, 10 being the most economically free, 0
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being the least. Refer to Gwartney & Larson (2009) for more detail on the construction of the
index.
We argue that - given our discussion on neoliberalism in the first section - a change in the EFI of
a country is the result of the enactment of some neoliberal/pro-market policy. Since the economic
freedom index is rooted in the removal of boundaries to commerce, trade, and individual choice, it
reflects the impacts of neoliberal policies. There are two indexes of economic freedom widely used
in the literature: one constructed by the Fraser Institute, the other by the Heritage foundation.
The Fraser Institute’s index of economic freedom has been more widely used in the literature
than that of the Heritage Foundation. Ram (2014) finds the two measures to be inconsistent,
leading to potential inference problems [35]. He uses both as explanatory variables for the Human
Development Index (HDI) published by the United Nations Development Programme, and finds
the Fraser Institute’s index to be more statistically reliable. Considering Ram’s findings, we
follow the literature in using the Fraser Institute’s Index.
The first of our control variables is a dummy variable for International Monetary Fund (IMF)
agreements. This variable codes for 1 if the country had any type of agreement with the IMF
in that year, and 0 if there was no agreement. The IMF often engages in lending to developing
nations in order to promote growth and development. The loans are highly subsidized, and
the “money is conditional on observance of several performance criteria” [19]. These conditions
on lending are two fold in purpose: they reduce risk for the IMF as the lender, and they also
serve to further the IMF’s development goals for that country. The conditionality on the loans
serves to both protect the IMF from a country’s incentive to abuse loan money, and to (try to)
solve the problems that caused the country to ask for a loan. Among these criteria are often
the elimination of price controls and the expansion of the financial sector. Since the past few
decades of globalization have allowed for greater economic activity on the global scale, economic
success has become more dependent on a country’s ability to interact with the global economy.
That is, a country must be open enough to survive. Thus IMF agreements typically involve
policies that allow for more trade, freer markets, etc. It is for this reason that we anticipate the
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presence of an IMF agreement to influence the EFI. We expect the coefficient on this variable
to be positive since the conditionality on an IMF agreement would likely increase the EFI of a
country.
We also observe a potential impact of economic crises on the institution of pro-market policies.
Economic crises are rhetorical fuel for political parties to push through new policies. Faced with
the aftermath of a crisis, politicians are forced by the public panic to make reforms in the hopes
of gaining control of the current situation and preventing another crisis from happening. Galasso
(2012) claims that, in reaction to economic crises, whether “pro-market structural reforms are
adopted or the role of the state economy expands ultimately depends on political and electoral
factors” [21]. That is to say, dependent on the ideology of the current administration, a crisis
could be used as fuel to push through pro-market policies in the hopes of stimulating the economy,
or to instate stricter interventionist policies in the hopes of calming the anxiety of those concerned
with economic uncertainty and job insecurity. Hence we control for the presence of an economic
crisis, expecting that it will either positively or negatively influence the EFI. This variable comes
from Reinhardt & Rogoff (2010), and includes currency crises, banking crises, inflation crises,
domestic sovereign debt crises, and external sovereign debt crises [36]. It is coded as 1 if there
was any of these types of crises in a given year, 0 if there was no crisis.
We also consider the impact that foreign direct investment (FDI) will have on neoliberal re-
forms. Bak & Moon (2016) explore the potential impact that FDI has on authoritarian stability
[6]. From this we gather more generally that FDI has some causal link to government incentives.
Foreign direct investment is characterized by the expansion or creation of an enterprise owned
or controlled by an entity in one country but operated in another (usually the lesser developed
nation). We claim that investors and participants in these enterprises have a stake in the en-
actment of pro-market policies because the recession of the state inherently benefits the private
sector. Hence we hypothesize that a high presence of FDI proportional to gross domestic product
(GDP) will correlate with an increase in pro-market policies (and therefore an increase in the
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EFI), and so we expect that FDI will be positively correlated with EFI. Data on FDI is drawn
from the World Bank database.
Theory dictates that economic development, typically measured by GDP per capita, will also
have an impact on the EFI. The greater the size of the economy, the more likely it is to have a
higher EFI. As mentioned previously, it is unlikely for developed countries with a high GDP to
be more closed off post-globalization. Thus GDP could be a contributing factor towards EFI.
We also consider the angle that a bigger country might have an easier time pushing through
policies, making it easier for them to boost their EFI. To the opposite end, it could be argued
that countries with a large economy have already neoliberalized, diminishing the marginal impact
of remittance flows on the EFI. Considering the theoretical indeterminacy of the type of impact
that GDP per capita will have on the EFI, the multiplicity of potential chains of causality justify
its use as a control variable.
A country’s pre-existing trade activity is also likely to influence their EFI. Since the ability
to trade is predicated on openness, we know that a high percentage of GDP dedicated to trade
will correspond to a higher EFI. Countries that have historically been reliant on trade thus will
have a higher EFI not due to an influx of remittances but to the economic structure of their
country that has led them to have a robust trade sector. Since trade openness contributes to
economic freedom, we expect the trade variable to have a positive coefficient.
Lastly, our variable of interest is remittance share of GDP. We gather this data from the
World Bank, and define it as the total amount of personal remittance received by a country
in a given year measured in current US dollars, as a percentage of GDP. This measure proxies
for the size of the diaspora, since more people living abroad would correspond to more money
being sent back home. We hypothesize that the size of a diaspora positively correlates to its
lobbying power, and so will positively influence the EFI. To empirically test our hypothesis that
diasporas facilitate pro-market policies in migrant sending countries, we regress the remittance
share of GDP on the EFI with our preliminary set of controls.
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Methods
5.1 Panel Data
We conduct our analysis on an unbalanced panel data set of 199 countries from the years of
1991 to 2015. Panel data allows us to see the relationship between remittances and neoliberalism
across the globe over time. Panel data sets have two dimensions: time and individual. In our
study the individual we conduct the panel data analysis on is the country. Our analysis will
include 199 countries across 15 years. We call this an “unbalanced” dataset because the years
in which we have data for each variable are different for each country. Instead of interpolating,
we leave the value of the variable missing. We will touch later in this section on how these holes
in our data affect our analysis. Remember that our dependent variable, the Economic Freedom
Index (EFI) is represented by yit, and the matrix of all our covariates is represented by Xkit
(where k is the control variable, i is the country, and t is the year).
Beginning with an Ordinary Least Squares Model (OLS), we regress the remittance share of
GDP on the EFI with our set of covariates. The results are shown in the table on the following
page.
Preliminary OLS results show us that we have a basis for furthering our exploration of the
relationship between remittances and neoliberalism, since we have a distinctly positive coefficient
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Table 5.1.1. OLS
(1)
EFI
remittofgdp 3.374∗∗∗
(0.306)
netODA 4.16e-11
(2.49e-11)
FDIofgdp 2.082∗∗∗
(0.429)
tradeofgdp 0.00318∗∗∗
(0.000585)
crisis -0.280∗∗∗
(0.0598)
GDPpc 0.0000553∗∗∗
(0.00000524)
cons 5.673∗∗∗
(0.0567)
N 1540
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
significant at the .001 alpha-level. However, we immediately reject the OLS model since it cannot
take into account the time dimension of the panel data.
Using panel data is advantageous because it allows us to account for certain unobservable
variables that might be correlated with the regressors [39]. When variables that aren’t included
in the model are influencing the regressors, it causes the estimated coefficients to be biased
(the omitted variable either positively or negatively impacts the estimated coefficients). This
is called omitted variable bias, which is one of the ways in which endogeneity can arise in a
model. Endogeneity occurs when the error term is correlated with one or more of the regressors.
Remember that the error in the model is the difference between the true value of y and the
estimated value of y (termed ŷ). That is, εit = yit − ŷit. It can arise from omitted variable bias,
simultaneity, and measurement error (the latter two will be talked about later in this section).
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Since panel data has both a time dimension and a cross sectional dimension, we must consider
that the error term will have a time-variant component as well as a time-invariant component.
Considering the multitude of countries included in our analysis, it is evident that there must be
some inherent characteristics of each country that impact at least one or more of our explanatory
variables. Culture, history, language, institutions etc. are all facets of a country that shape how
it responds to increases in remittances, trade, etc. These facets are all time-invariant: they do
not change over time. Since these inherent and time-invariant characteristics inevitably influence
our explanatory variables, we know that omitted variable bias must be present. We will refer
to these time-invariant characteristics of a country as “fixed effects” going forward. Since they
are unobservable and thus not included in the model, these fixed effects are part of the error
term. Thus the error term (εit), like the panel data itself, will have both time-variant and a
time-invariant component.
εit = ci + µit
Since ci - the time invariant part of the error term - is inherently correlated with the regressors,
the entire error term is also correlated with the regressors. In order to carry out an Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) regression, the assumptions of the Gauss-Markov theorem must be met.
That is [22],
1. Explanatory variables are non-stochastic
2. The conditional mean of the error term is 0. Rather, the no unobserved variables included
in the error term systematically affect y.
• E(εit|Xit) = 0
3. Homoskedasticity of the error term. That is, εit has constant variance
• var(εit|Xit) = σ2
4. No autocorrelation within the error term. That is, given any Xit, Xij and εit, εij such that
i 6= j,
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• cov(εit, εij |Xit, Xij) = 0
5. There is 0 covariance between the error term and the regressors.
• cov(εit, Xit) = 0
• E(εitXit) = 0
Note that these two expressions are equivalent.
6. The number of observations n must be greater than the number of explanatory variables.
7. The values of an explanatory variable must not all be the same. Rather, var(Xit) is some
positive finite number for each regressor X.
8. The regression model is correctly specified
9. There is no perfect multicollinearity. Rather, there are no perfect linear relationships be-
tween any of the explanatory variables.
Since cov(ci, Xit) 6= 0, the Gauss Markov assumption (5) is not met. The failure to meet this
assumption means that OLS estimates would be biased, since the variance in EFI caused by
part of the error term will be attributed to the regressors instead. That is,
E(xitci) 6= 0 (5.1.1)
E(xitεit) 6= 0 (5.1.2)
(5.1.3)
We also know that assumption (2) is violated as well. As previously stated, there is inherently
omitted variable bias by virtue of the panel data having both a country and a time dimension.
Thus we know that there are unobserved variables in the error term systematically affecting yit,
meaning that E(εit|Xit) 6= 0
The explicit violation of these assumptions leads us to believe that OLS is not the correct
model to display the relationship between remittances and neoliberalism in this panel data set.
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5.2 Fixed Effects
Since OLS is unable to deal with both dimensions of the panel data, we follow the literature in
considering the Random Effects (RE) and Fixed Effects (FE) models. The RE and FE models
consider that there are group effects happening within the model, but treat the group effects in
different ways. The RE model assumes that each “group” (in our case, country) is just a sample
drawn from a larger population, implying that the variation between the groups is random. Thus
in the RE model, the time invariant error ci is left as a part of the error term εit. By contrast,
the FE model treats each country as an individual that has their own characteristics, meaning
the variation between each country is systematic. Thus the FE model pulls the country specific
term ci out of the model.
We expect that the FE model will be more appropriate since it allows for the correlation of
ci with the explanatory variables [39]. To confirm our expectations, we run both a FE and RE
model, storing the estimates in the vectors β̂FE and β̂RE respectively. We then compute the
Hausman statistic [39] H as follows:
H = (β̂FE − β̂RE)′[V ar(β̂FE)− V ar(β̂RE)]−1(β̂FE − β̂RE) (5.2.1)
The null hypothesis is that ci is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, and RE is
preferred. Computing the Hausman statistic we get H = 0. Thus we reject the null in favor of
the FE model.
The FE model allows for the time invariant part of the error term to be correlated with
the regressors because it creates a dummy variable for each country. This dummy allows each
country to have a different y-intercept - representing the inherent unobserved differences (or
‘fixed effects’) in each country. Thus our model is as such:
yit = β0 + β1Xit + αi + µit (5.2.2)
Where Xit is our matrix of covariates, and αi is a dummy variable for each country i. Numerically
we can see how the fixed effects model eliminates the ci term that was biasing our OLS estimates.
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Take our original equation,
yit = β0 + β1x1it + β2x2it + · · ·+ βkxkit + (ci + µit) (5.2.3)
Where xkit is the country dummy variable k in year t of country i. We complete a ’within trans-
formation’ (a transformation‘within’ each panel) by first averaging each term of the equation
across time, and subtracting the result from the original equation [39].
yi = β0 + β1x1i + β2x2i + · · ·+ βkxki + (ci + µi) (5.2.4)
yit − yi = β1(x1it − x1i) + · · ·+ βk(xkit − xki) + (µit − µi) (5.2.5)
Which can be written as:
ÿit = β0 + β1ẍ1it + β2ẍ2it + · · ·+ βkẍkit + µ̈it (5.2.6)
where ÿ, ẍkit, µ̈it are time demeaned terms (the mean of each is 0). In order for the FE model
to be consistent, we must have that cov(µ̈it, ẍjit) = 0 for all explanatory variables j. Thus we
assume cov(µit, xjit) = 0 in order for the FE estimator to be consistent. Note that we no longer
have to assume there is no correlation between the time-invariant part of the error and the
explanatory terms.
Now that we have confirmed that the FE model best addresses the endogeneity caused by
the correlation between ci and the regressors, we address the issue of heteroskedasticity. As
mentioned previously, the presence of heteroskedasticity means the error term has non-constant
variance. Heteroskedasticity does not break any assumption of the model, but can make the
estimates less precise. It can also cause misleading small standard errors and p-values. We test
for heteroskedasticity using Stata’s xttest3 (refer to Stata documentation for an explanation
of the test). We reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity, and conclude that there is het-
eroskedasticity.
To ensure that our standard errors are accurate in the face of heteroskedasticity, we cluster
standard errors by country (since the errors are grouped by country) using Stata’s cluster com-
mand. Using clustered standard errors, the standard errors in our model are consistent with
heteroskedasticity.
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Below are the results of the FE model.
Table 5.2.1. Fixed Effects
EFI
Remittances % of GDP 2.804∗∗∗
(0.818)
Net ODA 5.14e-11
(4.16e-11)
FDI % of GDP 1.376∗
(0.679)
Trade % of GDP 0.00169
(0.00130)
Crisis -0.278∗∗∗
(0.0728)
GDP per capita 0.000117∗∗∗
(0.0000282)
Constant 5.587∗∗∗
(0.154)
Observations 1540
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Since we have a strong positive coefficient on remittances as percentage of GDP, and it is
significant at the alpha level of .01, we have reason to believe that our hypothesis is rooted
in empirical truth - motivating us to continue our empirical analysis. Using the FE model,
however, only allows us to account for the endogeneity that is caused by country fixed effects.
What about the other unobservables, aside from ci, that are inevitably included in the error
term? As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, endogeneity can arise from a number of
other things. Since it is certain that we do still have endogeneity in our model, we move on to
a two-stage least squares estimation.
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5.3 Two Stage Least Squares
Two stage least squares models (2SLS) utilize an instrumental variable (“an instrument”) to
address the endogeneity that we could not address in the fixed effects model. Our first model
only accounts for the endogeneity caused by omitted variable bias- specifically via time-invariant
country characteristics. We must consider that endogeneity arises from other channels as well:
simultaneity, measurement error, and other types of omitted variable bias.
Theoretically, simultaneity could be present in our model because of the potential impact
that neoliberalism has on remittances. We acknowledge that even if remittances do positively
impact neoliberalism in migrant sending countries, the presence of neoliberalism could in fact
be influencing remittances at the same time (thus making remittances an endogenous variable).
The presence of neoliberal policies, as argued more specifically in the first section, retracts the
state from economic affairs. This could mean that barriers to migration are eased, allowing
people to migrate out of the country more easily and ultimately creating a larger diaspora to
send remittances home. It could also mean that the pre-existing diaspora starts remitting more
back home because of the reduction in costs to sending/receiving remittances. Theoretically we
can conclude that there is cause for neoliberal policies to be influencing remittances at the same
time remittances are influencing neoliberal policies. If we have that remittances are determined
by something within the model, we know that remittances will be correlated with the error term
εit. Thus remittances is an endogenous variable.
We also consider measurement error as a source of endogeneity that could not be dealt with
in our first FE model. If either the dependent or independent variables were measured impre-
cisely, the measurement error of the variable becomes part of the error term - meaning that the
imprecisely measured variable and the error term will be correlated. Thus we have endogeneity
arising from measurement error.
Lastly we have omitted variable bias. In our fixed effects model, we considered time-invariant
country specific characteristics to be an omitted variable causing bias in the OLS estimator. We
saw that using the fixed effects model allowed for this correlation between ci and the regressors.
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However, we know that there must be other variables that are impacting the regressors outside of
the time-invariant characteristics that we controlled for in the FE model. In this case an omitted
variable will be an unobserved that influences the EFI and a regressor but is not included in
the model. This will cause correlation between the error term and that particular regressor, thus
creating endogeneity.
Since we have three defined sources of endogeneity that were not able to be addressed in the
fixed effects model, we search for another way in which to ‘remove’ the endogeneity, so to speak.
According to convention, we move to a two stage least squares model. First we will establish
what the 2SLS model does and how it deals with the problem of endogeneity, then we will go
into detail about our choice of instrument.
5.3.1 Model
The 2SLS model uses an “instrumental variable” z that is correlated with the dependent variable
y and uncorrelated with the endogenous explanatory variable x. That is, z satisfies the following
conditions [39]:
cov(zit, εit) = 0
cov(zit, xit) 6= 0
The 2SLS model is appropriately named: it is comprised of a first stage regression and a
second stage regression. Given our original equation:
y = β0 + β1x1it + β2x2it + · · ·+ βkxkit + εit
Where k is the control variables in our model, and x1it is remittances as percentage of GDP -
our endogenous variable.
Our first stage equation is defined as:
x1it = π0 + π1zit + νit
Where the IV zit is correlated with the endogenous variable x1it, and νit is the error term.
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The second stage equation is defined as:
yit = α0 + α1x̂1it + α2x2it + · · ·+ αkxkit + eit
Where x̂1it is the vector of predicted values of remittances as % of GDP obtained after
running the first stage equation. The problem that we are trying to address is the correlation of
x1it with the error term εit. This first stage equation accomplishes this by removing the variance
in x1it that is correlated with εit. Note when we complete the first stage equation, x̂it will be
UNcorrelated with the error term since by assumption, zit is uncorrelated with εit. That is, the
endogenous part of x1it will become a part of νit, leaving x̂1it free of endogeneity. Note that:
x1it = π̂0 + π̂1zit + ν̂
= x̂1it + ν̂
Recall that ν̂it is the residual of our first stage equation, and that the residual is always the
difference between the actual and predicted outcome values. Thus xit = x̂it+ ν̂ intuitively makes
sense. We use this to substitute into the following equation:
yit = λ0 + λ1x1it + λ2ν̂it + εit
Which gives us:
yit = λ0 + λ1x̂1it + (λ1 + λ2)ν̂ + εit
Then we have that λ1 = α1, and that x̂1it and ν̂it are uncorrelated by our first stage equation.
The ν̂it term in effect “controls” for the endogeneity in x1it.
The estimator for the IV model will be defined as [39]:
β̂1 =
Σni=1(zit − z̄i)(yit − ȳi)
Σni=1(zit − z̄i)(xit − x̄i)
Since the probability limit of β̂1 is β̂1 (plim(β̂1) = β̂1), we have that β̂1 is a consistent estimator
for remittances (x1it)
1.
1For a more detailed explanation of why β̂0 is consistent, and other properties of the IV estimator, please refer to [39]
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5.3.2 Instrument Justification
Since cov(zit, εit) = 0, we know that conceptually our instrument zit affects yit ONLY through
x1it, the endogenous variable [39]. Thus for an instrument to fit our criteria, it must be correlated
with remittances but uncorrelated with εit. If the instrument is uncorrelated with εit, then the
instrument is valid. However, since εit is inherently unobserved, there is no way to empirically
test the validity of our instrument zit. Thus we continue by theoretically justifying the validity
of zit.
We follow Barajas et al (2009) in our choice of instrument, which will be the ratio of remit-
tances to GDP of all other receiving countries [8]. That is,
zit =
(Σni=1remittancesi)− remittancesi
(Σni=1GDPi)−GDPi
Since we want zit to be uncorrelated with εit, we theoretically want it to have no direct causal
link to the EFI (remember that the instrument affects the EFI only through our endogenous
variable, remittances). Since by construction, zit excludes the remittance to GDP ratio of country
i for each zit, the instrument cannot be correlated directly with the EFI of country i. However,
since zit contains the ratio of remittances to GDP of all other countries, we know that it has
to be correlated with the remittance to GDP ratio of country i. That is, since zit represents the
world trend of remittances, it is intuitive that the remittance to GDP ratio of country i would
be correlated with zit. Thus we have that, theoretically, zit satisfies our requirements of being
correlated with remittances and uncorrelated with εit.
The instrument proposed by Barajas et al (2009) also satisfies the condition that cov(zit, x1it) 6=
0 [8]. We see this by regressing zit on x1it with the rest of our covariates. The results are reported
in the table on the following page.
Since we have a strongly positive and significant correlation between zit and x1it, we can
conclude that zit meets the second assumption.
To further justify our use of zit as an instrument, we look at the strength of the instrument.
Staiger & Stock (1994) provide a “rule of thumb” for testing weak instruments [42]. They claim
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Table 5.3.1. Strength
(1)
remittofgdp
remittinst 9.185∗∗∗
(0.536)
netODA -5.44e-12∗∗∗
(1.20e-12)
FDIofgdp 0.0271
(0.0197)
tradeofgdp 0.000206∗∗∗
(0.0000299)
crisis -0.00548
(0.00329)
GDPpc -0.00000383∗∗∗
(0.000000261)
cons 0.000972
(0.00364)
N 2855
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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that if the first stage F-statistic is larger than 10, the instrument can be considered strong.
However, this “rule of thumb” test only functions well for one instrument, and only takes into
consideration bias and not size distortion [43]. Our first stage F-statistic does exceed 10, and so
by Staiger & Stock’s rule of thumb is considered strong [42]. To be sure, we move to the most
recent methods of testing for weak instruments.
According to Stock and Yogo (2002), an instrument is weak if “the bias of the IV estimator,
relative to the bias of ordinary least squares, could exceed a certain threshold b, for example
10%” [43]. Their test for a weak instrument is based on the Cragg-Donald (1993) statistic,
however the null hypothesis is that the instrument is weak. Since weakness is defined by the bias
of the estimator, Stock and Yogo (2005) determine critical values that represent the maximum
amount of relative bias that could be present in the IV estimator. After running the 2SLS model
using Stata’s xtivreg2 command, we obtain Stock and Yogo (2002)’s critical values 2. Each
critical value corresponds to a maximal amount of bias that can be present in the IV estimator
[43]. Stata reports critical values for 10%, 15%, 20% and 25% maximal possible bias. If the first
Cragg-Donald statistic 3 (analog to the f-statistic of the first stage equation) is bigger than the
critical value, we can conclude that our IV estimator has a maximum bias of the corresponding
percentage 4. When running the 2SLS model, we find that the reported Cragg-Donald statistic
exceeds the critical value for a 10% maximum estimator bias. Thus we reject the null hypothesis
that the instrument is weak and conclude that it is strong enough to use in our model [15].
5.3.3 Endogeneity
Now that we have established the model and justified the use of our instrument, we empirically
establish the endogeneity of remittances as % of GDP. We do this in two ways. We repeat
the same proccess of the Hausman test as we did earlier in this chapter for the fixed and
random effects models. This time the null hypothesis is that OLS is the preferred model, and the
alternative hypothesis is that endogeneity is present and 2SLS is preferred. Since our Hausman
2please refer to Stock and Yogo’s paper for more on the construction of these critical values
3See Cragg & Donald (1993)
4Please see [4] for a table of critical values
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statistic for these two estimations is 0, we reject the null and conclude that there is endogeneity
and thus a need to use the 2SLS model.
We can see empirically the presence of endogeneity more clearly by running some regressions.
First we take our first stage equation (shown below), and save the estimated residuals νit.
x1it = β0 + β1zit + β3x2it + · · ·+ βkxkit + νit
We then include the estimated residuals in our second stage equation (shown below).
yit = α0 + α1x1it + · · ·+ αkxkit + αk+1νit
The results are shown below.
Table 5.3.2. Endogeneity
EFI
Residual -5.809∗∗∗
(1.232)
Net ODA 5.29e-11∗
(2.48e-11)
FDI % of GDP 1.338∗∗
(0.455)
Trade % of GDP 0.00222∗∗∗
(0.000616)
Crisis -0.161∗
(0.0645)
GDP per capita 0.0000740∗∗∗
(0.00000655)
Remittances % of GDP 8.769∗∗∗
(1.184)
cons 5.422∗∗∗
(0.0775)
N 1540
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Since the coefficient on the first stage residual is large in magnitude (the sign is not of impor-
tance) and significant, we can conclude that there is endogeneity. Since zit is by construction
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not correlated with the error term εit, we know that x̂1it will be uncorrelated with εit. This is
because any of the variation in x1it that is not determined by zit will be included in the residual
νit.
Thus when we include the residual νit from the first stage in the second stage equation, the
coefficient on the residual tells us there was a part of our remittance variable that was correlated
with the original error term εit. Since we have empirically justified the presence of endogeneity
and the use of our instrument, we move on to the results.
5.3.4 2SLS Results
Note that in the absence of a predetermined test for the presence of heteroskedasticity in a 2SLS
model, we proceed by using a visual representation.
Figure 5.3.1. Heteroskedasticity
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The graph above shows a cone shaped distribution of the estimated errors, leading us to
conclude that there is unequal variance of the error term. Given this visual representation, and
that we previously corrected for heteroskedasticity in the fixed effects model, we will employ the
same country-clustered standard errors as we did in the FE model. Thus all of the test statistics
and estimates will be robust to heteroskedastic errors. Then our final 2SLS model is as follows:
yit = β0 + β1x̂1it + · · ·+ βkxkit + εit
Table 5.3.3. 2SLS
EFI
Remittances % of GDP 9.861∗∗∗
(2.294)
Net ODA -1.10e-11
(4.83e-11)
FDI % of GDP 0.787
(0.516)
Trade % of GDP 0.00104
(0.00133)
Crisis -0.185∗
(0.0781)
GDP per capita 0.000106∗∗∗
(0.0000269)
N 1536
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
We consider the 9.861 coefficient on remittances as % of GDP to be a very large and pos-
itive magnitude. Since we are measuring remittances as a percentage of GDP (represented as
a porportion out of 1), the coefficient tells us that a 1% increase of remittance share of GDP
corresponds to .09861 increase in the EFI on average. Note that the standard deviation of the
EFI is .995. However it is unlikely that a country’s remittance share of GDP would increase
by an entire percentage point in one year. It is more likely that remittance share of GDP will
5Please refer to the table at the beginning of chapter 4
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move by tenths or hundreths of a percent. Thus we can reinterpret the coefficient to mean that
a 0.1% increase in remittance share of GDP corresponds to a .9861 average increase in the EFI.
This is roughly equivalent to one standard error of the EFI. Also note that the inclusion of our
controls (net ODA, FDI, Trade, and economic crisis) means that this effect is contingent upon
holding these factors constant. Since the coefficient is significant at the alpha-level of .001, we
have strong reason to believe that remittances impact neoliberal policies.
Also note that the inclusion of an instrumental variable decreases the significance of the
coefficients on our other control variables, compared to our OLS and FE estimates. However our
crisis dummy remains significant at the .05 alpha-level. Our coefficient of the crisis variable is
−0.185, meaning that the presence of a crisis 6 decreases the EFI by 0.185 on average. This is
consistent with our expectation that a crisis would cause political leaders to tighten up economic
policy potentially in fear of another crisis occurring or in order to reign in the current crisis (or
both).
GDP per capita remains significant at the .01 alpha-level. The coefficient indicates that a unit
increase (measured as $1 per person) coincides with a .000106 increase in the EFI. Since the
standard deviation of GDP per capita is 17950.83, we know that a $1 change in GDP per capita
is relatively insignificant. Thus we can reinterpret the coefficient as meaning a $100 increase in
GDP per capita corresponds to a .0106 increase in the EFI on average. This is consistent with
our hypothesis that the relative size of the economy to the population could mean an inherently
higher EFI since bigger economies are more globalized, or that it is easier for bigger economies
to push through policies.
5.3.5 2SLS by Region
Next we run the 2SLS model individually for each region. The World Bank defines seven distinct
regions of the world: North America, East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Sub-
Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and South
6Note that the crisis dummy is coded as 0 if there is no crisis, and 1 if there is a crisis. Thus a unit increase in the crisis
variable is equivalent saying the presence of a crisis.
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Asia. Please refer to table A.0.1 in the Appendix for key summary statistics of each region.
Considering that there is often a regional convergence among countries, we expect that some
regions might present a stronger or a weaker relationship between remittances and neoliberalism
than the world trend that we saw in the previous section. The results are provided in the table
below.
Table 5.3.4. 2SLS by Region
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4 Reg 6 Reg 7
EFI EFI EFI EFI EFI EFI
RemittofGDP 10.86∗∗ 4.269∗∗ 1.127 4.893 3.344∗∗∗ 29.55∗∗∗
(3.746) (1.537) (1.240) (5.792) (0.833) (3.676)
NetODA -3.31e-11 -1.81e-10∗∗ 9.33e-12 -1.38e-10 -6.83e-11 -3.03e-11
(3.81e-11) (6.26e-11) (1.08e-10) (7.24e-11) (5.31e-11) (4.81e-11)
FDIofGDP -0.173 0.400 4.907∗∗∗ 1.981 10.08 1.514∗
(0.343) (0.845) (1.191) (1.782) (5.606) (0.617)
TradeofGDP 0.0000599 0.00621∗∗ -0.00107 0.00212 0.0137∗∗∗ -0.00712∗∗
(0.00136) (0.00202) (0.00160) (0.00383) (0.00356) (0.00249)
Crisis -0.408∗∗∗ -0.187 -0.298∗∗∗ -0.481∗∗ -0.371∗ 0.171
(0.0866) (0.165) (0.0679) (0.163) (0.149) (0.131)
GDP pc 0.0000776∗∗ 0.000246∗∗∗ -0.00000825 0.000202∗∗∗ 0.000304∗∗ 0.000241∗∗∗
(0.0000263) (0.0000230) (0.0000241) (0.0000409) (0.000102) (0.0000575)
N 158 176 418 139 97 548
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Regions
Label Region Name
Reg 1 East Asia
Reg 2 Europe & Central Asia
Reg 3 Latin American & Caribbean
Reg 4 Middle East & North Africa
Reg 5 North America
Reg 6 South Asia
Reg 7 Sub-Saharan Africa
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Note that since North America only contains the United States and Canada, region 5 is
omitted from the regression table because there is not enough data to run the model. We see
that there is a heterogenous effect of remittance share of GDP on EFI across regions. Since
the coefficients for Latin America & the Caribbean and Middle East & North Africa are not
significant, we cannot conclude anything about these results. Thus we will focus on the results
of Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and East Asia & Pacific.
We begin with East Asia and the Pacific. The coefficient of remittance share of GDP, 10.86 is
higher than our preliminary 2SLS coefficient, indicating that the relationship between remittance
share of GDP and neoliberalism is stronger in that region than the average relationship in all the
regions. This indicates that a percentage increase in remittances corresponds to a 1.086 average
increase in EFI. The crisis and GDP per capita variables remain significant with the same sign
as in our original model - thus our interpretation remains the same.
We also note that South Asia has the lowest significant coefficient on remittance share of GDP.
A percent increase in remittance share of GDP increases the EFI .033 on average in South Asia,
as opposed to .098 on average among all regions. Since South Asia has both the highest average
remittance share of GDP (and highest level of remittances in USD) and also the lowest average
GDP per capita, we would expect the effect of remittances on the EFI in South Asia to be higher
than the effect among all countries. Low GDP pc would provide incentive for people to emigrate,
and a high remittance share of GDP would indicate a stronger presence of neoliberalism 7
Though we cannot with certainty determine the cause for this difference in impact that defies
our expectations, we can speculate. We hypothesize that there might be a diminishing returns
effect for remittances. That is, after an original increase in remittances sparking an increase in
the EFI, the subsequent increases in remittances produce progressively smaller impacts on the
EFI. Since South Asia has a high remittance share of GDP yet a low coefficient, it could be the
case that South Asia is on the end of an upward trend in remittances where the marginal effect
7The claim that a high average remittance share of GDP would lead us to expect a higher increase in the EFI relies on
the cutt-off effect in the original 2SLS model that we discuss in section 5.4.3
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on neoliberalism is small. Refer to the table below to see the average remittance share of GDP
of all South Asian countries over time.
Figure 5.3.2.
The graph shows us that there has been an upward (or even exponential) trend in remittance
share of GDP that starts to drop off in the last few years of our data. This could indicate that
the recent increases in remittances have had no effect on neoliberalism in South Asia because
earlier and steeper increases in remittances could have already pushed neoliberalism to its limits
in South Asia.
Most notable is the increase of the coefficient on remittance share of GDP for Sub-Saharan
Africa. The coefficient of 29.55 and p-value of 0 indicates that there is a very strong positive
and significant relationship between remittances and neoliberalism in Sub-Saharan Africa. The
interpretation of this value is that a percent increase in remittance share of GDP corresponds
to a 2.95 increase in the EFI of Sub-Saharan Africa on average. Remember that the standard
deviation of the EFI is .99 8. The standard deviation of the EFI for only Sub-Saharan Africa is
.89. Using either benchmark for standard deviation, a percent increase in remittance share of
GDP corresponds to an average increase in EFI of more than two standard deviations.
8Please refer to Table 5.3.4
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Again, we cannot establish with certainty a reason for Sub-Saharan Africa having a much
larger correlation between remittances and neoliberalism. However, this result is consistent with
our conjecture that diminishing returns are pushing down the coefficient in South Asia. Note that
Sub-Saharan Africa - despite not having a notable remittance share of GDP - receives the least
amount of total remittance inflows of all of the countries. Since the very low level of remittances
corresponds to a very high impact of remittances on the EFI in this region, we suspect that the
diminishing returns effect discussed in the context of South Asia is acting on the opposite end
in Sub-Saharan Africa. That is, since remittances are at such a low total level, the marginal
increases in EFI produced by an increase in remittance share of GDP will be large comparative
to the increase in remittances. We expect that if the level of remittance inflows increased in
Sub-Saharan Africa, then their marginal impact on the EFI would decrease. This division of our
model into regions shows that high levels of remittances correspond to low marginal impacts
of remittances on the EFI, and low levels of remittances correspond to high marginal impacts
of remittances on the EFI. Thus we have reason to believe that there are diminishing returns
to neoliberalism within regions. If remittances have already pushed neoliberalism to the extent
that the associated incentives allows them, then it makes sense that any further increases in
remittances would be less impactful.
Sub-Saharan Africa also has an interesting regional effect because the trade coefficient has
switched signs while remaining significant. This is the opposite effect we expect trade to have on
the EFI 9. We hypothesize that this negative and significant impact of trade on the EFI could
be a result of long-present economic characteristics of Sub-Saharan Africa. There is a broad
base of literature on the “resource curse” (otherwise known as the “Dutch Disease”); a term
coined to represent the phenomenon of resource rich countries being stuck in cycles of poverty or
low growth despite having access to potential income from exports. This literature has explored
how the presence of natural resources (often in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa) impacts
9Please refer to Chapter 4 or the discussion of results in section 5.3.4 for an explanation of expectations
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not only growth rates but also democracy and the quality of political institutions 10. Since
the literature establishes a link between resource richness (normally measured by exports) and
political institutions, we hypothesize that the potential detrimental impact of natural resource
exports on governance quality could lead trade to lower EFI in countries that export mainly
natural resources.
We also note that Europe & Central Asia as well and Sub-Saharan Africa are the only two
regions where our crisis variable is insignificant. We hypothesize that this could potentially be a
result of these being two regions containing the most countries. It could be the case that, given
the multiplicity of countries included in the regions, there is too much variation in crisis presence
across the countries included in these regions.
Given the disparity of coefficients between each of the regions, we can conclude that there is
a heterogenous effect of remittances on neoliberalism across regions.
5.4 Robustness
5.4.1 Missing Data
For an unbalanced panel data set, the convention in the field of economics is to complete re-
gression analysis with the holes in the data (as opposed to interpolating). Since we are using
an unbalanced panel, we find a need to see how sensitive our results are to missing data points.
Thus we do an informal test to see how this missing data is potentially impacting our regression
analysis.
We run a for-loop dropping one observation with replacement and running the model each
iteration. The result is a vector of coefficients obtained from running the model 11 with n − 1
observations. We claim that if a missing data point was important to the model, the dropping
of that data point would significantly change the coefficient of remittances.
10Collier (2010), Auty (2007), and Ulfelder (2007) contribute to this literature on the impacts of natural resource richness
on political and economic outcomes
11for access to the results of this and the following robustness checks please contact the author
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After running the for-loop, we find that no dropped data point changed the coefficient larger
than one standard error of the original model coefficient. From this we can establish that the
missing data in our unbalanced panel are not influential in the relationship between remittances
and neoliberalism in the 2SLS model.
5.4.2 Country Drivers
Our second sensitivity analysis uses another for-loop to drop an entire country panel at a time,
with replacement. Though we have a strongly positive and significant relationship between re-
mittances and neoliberalism as discussed in section 5.3.4, we cannot be sure that this relationship
is being driven by a particular country. Thus by dropping one country each iteration, we are
able to determine the magnitude of the influence of that particular country on the results.
Employing the same standard as in the previous test, we check the new vector of regression
coefficients to see if any are outside of one standard error (plus or minus) of the original coef-
ficient. Since all coefficients are within one standard error of the original regression coefficient
(9.861), we conclude that there are no particular country drivers of the relationship between
remittances and neoliberalism.
5.4.3 A Threshold for Remittances
Next we consider the possibility that the relationship between remittances and neoliberalism
is dependent on how important remittances are to the economy of the receiving country. We
predict that there is a threshold for remittances as percent of GDP below which remittances
aren’t a significant enough part of the country’s economy to be pushing neoliberalism. Note
that in the below figure 12, the EFI varies more for observations with lower remittance shares of
GDP. Since there seems to be a convergence of the EFI after a certain level of remittance share
of GDP, we have empirical reason to explore the presence of a remittance threshold.
12note that the plotted points represent individual observations, not entire panels
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Figure 5.4.1. Remittances vs. EFI
Again we run a for-loop, this time dropping all countries with average (across time) remittances
as % of GDP below a certain threshold. Each iteration, we increase the threshold for remittances
as % of GDP. After pushing the threshold to .0018% remittances of GDP, we have a consistently
higher coefficient. The results below show the 2SLS model with country clustered standard errors
without countries that have an average remittance share of GDP below .0018%. Please see Table
A.0.2 in the appendix for a list of dropped countries and their average remittance share of GDP
across time.
Imposing a threshold for remittance share of GDP at .0018% increases the remittance coef-
ficient from 9.861 to 10.03. The coefficient remains significant at the .001 level. Note that the
magnitude and significance of the control coefficients are almost exactly the same as those in
the original model. Thus we have a stronger (and equally as significant) relationship between
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Table 5.4.1. Average Remittance Threshold
(1)
EFI
remittofgdp 10.03∗∗∗
(2.329)
netODA -1.42e-11
(4.80e-11)
FDIofgdp 0.714
(0.500)
tradeofgdp 0.00109
(0.00138)
crisis -0.189∗
(0.0837)
GDPpc 0.000123∗∗∗
(0.0000270)
N 1495
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
remittances and neoliberalism for countries with an average remittance share of GDP above
.0018%.
The results in this section demonstrate that there is a notable impact of remittance inflows
on the presence of neoliberal policies in the remittance receiving country. We determine that
there is a heterogenous effect across regions but not across individual country panels. We also
determine that the results are robust to missing data, and that the results are strengthened by
imposing a minimum threshold on remittance share of GDP.
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6
Conclusion
In order to entirely evaluate the relationship between remittances and neoliberalism that we find
in this paper, it is important for us to look at the actual implementation of neoliberal reforms.
There has been much academic work on the economic and social effects of neoliberal policies 1.
This literature mostly argues that neoliberalism produces negative socioeconomic effects in terms
of increasing institutional inequality. Navarro (2007) addresses the self-contradiction present in
neoliberal policies:
“Another correction that needs to be made as a rebuttal to neoliberal dogma is that
neoliberal public policies have been remarkably unsuccessful at achieving what they
claim to be their aims: economic efficiency and social well-being.” [30]
Though neoliberals of the MPS and the general intellectual foundations of neoliberalism intended
to shift the politico-economic structure in order to ensure individual freedom, the implemen-
tation of these ideas in policy do not realize these intentions. The realization of the aims of
neoliberalism, if they are ever to be realized, will occur in the long run. Thus the time lapsed
between policy implementation and the intended effect of those policies needs to be considered.
1For examples, please see [46] [49] [50] [40] [32]
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The short run cost of imposing these policies most detrimental to those who were struggling in
poverty to begin with.
There is an inherent “tendency to look at the distribution of world power while ignoring class
power within each country” [30]. That is, neoliberal policies do well to address the power strug-
gles between countries, but do fail at (and even exacerbate) power struggles within a country.
The class structure that is ignored by neoliberal policies is most affected by them. In coun-
tries that follow neoliberal public policies, the gap between the top and bottom rungs of the
socioeconomic ladder widens as poverty expands and the rich grow richer [30]. The Reagan ad-
ministration, though efficient in making institutional changes, ultimately “change[d] the nature
of state intervention, such that it benefited even more the upper classes and the economic groups
(such as military-related corporations) that financed [Reagan’s] electoral campaigns” [30]. As we
have seen in the first chapter, neoliberal policies include privatization and the general prioritiza-
tion of corporate interests. The elite - the controllers of said corporations - benefit from relaxed
regulations and freer capital flows. Meanwhile, those that were struggling to begin with become
deprived of the welfare programs that once supported them. Since the upper class holds the
power, it has the political influence to lobby for such neoliberal policies - and consequently the
ability to maintain class power by ensuring that the bottom stays at the bottom. Neoliberalism,
then, is the “practice of the dominant classes of the developed and developing worlds alike” [30].
This begs the question: why would anyone lobby or push for policies that would adversely
affect them in the end? Since families are immediately better off because of the extra income
they receive from remittances, they are blinded by the detrimental effects of the neoliberal
policies that are enacted. This immediate improvement in financial circumstances for remittance
receiving families is the ability to change their outlook on the economic and political state of
their country. Remittance receivers consequently perceive that things are better, and could
potentially attribute their newfound situation to government action, leading them to support
the administration and/or policies in place [3]. Remittance receivers’ then act on their incentives
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to support neoliberal policies because they are ignorant of short run costs of neoliberalism and
because remittances lead them to falsely trust the government.
Understanding the implications of neoliberalism (which we cannot do fully in the scope of this
paper) brings an air of caution to our results. In our analysis, we conclude that a bigger diaspora
size is linked to more neoliberal reforms in the country of origin. It is important, then, to note
that those countries receiving remittances had economic and political shortcomings that sparked
migration to begin with. According to Kapur, “the relative importance of political and economic
factors underlying migration decisions will affect the nature and intensity of engagement with
the country of origin after departure” [27]. From this we can deduce that a larger diaspora
size (marked by a higher remittance share of GDP) indicates that the institutional political and
economic shortcoming of the origin country were either more severe or more widespread compar-
atively. Since existing literature concludes that neoliberalism increases inequality by increasing
the wealth at the top and decreasing wealth at the bottom, neoliberalism will have more detri-
mental development outcomes for countries that have a broader base of disenfranchised people
to begin with. That is, based on our results, countries with higher remittances will end up with
higher inequality through the diaspora-neoliberalism channel we have established.
This begs another question: will remittances induce a cyclic downturn of development out-
comes for countries with high remittance shares of GDP? If remittances increase neoliberal
reforms, and there is a consensus that neoliberalism increases inequality, then the resulting in-
equality would cause another wave of migration, restarting the cycle. The results in this paper
then, when discussed in the greater context of neoliberalism, have serious theoretical implications
for development. Thus the general positive outlook on remittances as a development mechanism
in the literature needs to be questioned.
There is space in this new and growing body of literature to expand on the economic and
political dimensions of remittances and migration. Given that there are more dimensions of
migration and remittances to be explored, the chain of causality established in our results could
be extended. The combined effect of increased household income and a neoliberalized state could
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induce financialization. Neoliberalism, because it promotes massive steps toward deregulation
and capital mobility, creates a more complex and more politically influential financial sector [12]
[28]. The remittances that induce neoliberalization (as we have discovered in this paper) also
increase household income, potentially creating a higher demand for formal financial institutions.
Thus the effect that we find of remittances on neoliberalism warrants further research integrating
the topic of financialization.
Since we have found a heterogenous impact of remittances on the EFI across regions, our
results also call for a deeper empirical analysis of this relationship in each individual region. These
regional groupings could be due to a regional fixed effect that could be explored qualitatively
at a more anthropological level. Culture determines social relations, beliefs, and norms, among
others. Since many of the channels through which remittances impact neoliberalism are rooted
in familial ties, the relationship between remittances in neoliberalism must be impacted by the
structure and dynamic of those ties, and by beliefs about money. Then how do attributes of
different cultures impact the way in which neoliberalism responds to diaspora size in different
countries? We can account for these unobserved differences across countries empirically but are
in need of a more bottom-up methodological framework in order to know more about these
differences.
Since we assess this relationship at a broad level, across countries and time, we cannot give
specific policy recommendations given the diversity of institutions and other country specific
characteristics. However, based on questions raised in the previous chapter, both international
and domestic policy needs to account for the dynamics of remittances and migration that we
have discussed throughout this paper. Developing countries might need political safeguards to
protect against remittances inducing a downward spiral that worsens development outcomes.
The pressure to neoliberalize on developing countries is overwhelming, and does not only come
from the incentives provided by increased remittances. Developing countries often see other
nations imposing neoliberal reforms, and follow suit in the hopes that the extra income they
are getting from remittances will help make these reforms successful in solving their problems.
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International institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank corner developing countries into
neoliberal reforms by imposing conditions on loans and development aid. Given the relationship
we find, there is a need to figure out a way to potentially leverage the income gained from
remittances to subvert this pressure in an effort to protect developing countries from the woes
of neoliberalism. Our discussion also brings into question the pro-market policy implementation
that are often forced on developing countries by international institutions as requirements for
development aid. Conditions on aid might be more destructive to developing countries than
originally intended. Considering that pressure on developing nations to neoliberalize is already
coming from remittances and other international pressures, and that neoliberalism is in the
short run detrimental to development, there might be a need for international institutions to
reconsider the structure of development aid.
While migration literature has historically focused on the impact of migration on the migrant
receiving country, we contribute to a growing body of work exploring the impact of migration
on the sending country. We contradict the general consensus that remittances have a positive of
this new body of work that remittances have positive development outcomes for migrant-sending
countries. Like Abdih et al. (2012) and Ahmed (2017), our findings establish that there is reason
for caution when evaluating the influence of remittances on the political economy of the country
of origin [3] [1].
As migration rates increase inline with interconnections and technological advancements of the
world, remittance flows become a more integral part of understanding political economies, and
diasporas gain more political power. The results found in this paper confirm that the size of the
diaspora has an influence on the political economy of the migrant sending country. We go further
than the existing literature in establishing that the size of the diaspora positively influences the
implementation of neoliberal reforms in the country of origin through the channel of remittances.
These results establish cause for further study on this relationship and its implications both
theoretically and empirically.
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Appendix A
Table A.0.1. Summary Statistics By Region
Region Avg. Remitt (% of GDP) Avg. GDP pc ($) Remitt (thousands $)
Reg 1 2.38 11817.75 1944863.7
Reg 2 2.23 24522.69 2108429.2
Reg 3 2.94 8308.629 1251928.5
Reg 4 2.42 15726.92 1837900.5
Reg 5 2.15 54686.34 2520568
Reg 6 3.67 1712.442 7242546
Reg 7 2.72 2074.013 471923.47
Table A.0.2.
Dropped Panels
Country Avg. Remittances (% of GDP) Region
Chad .0000135 Sub Saharan Africa
Central African Republic .0000145 Sub Saharan Africa
Kuwait .0000217 Middle East & N. Africa
Libya .0000489 Middle East & N. Africa
Angola .0000958 Sub Saharan Africa
Chile .000101 Latin America & Caribbean
Eritrea .0001732 Sub Saharan Africa
Saudi Arabia .0001768 Middle East & N. Africa
Venezuela .0001872 Latin America & Caribbean
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